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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Appellant's action was brought to recover dam-
ages for injuries allegedly sustained when she fell 
after getting out of a parked automobile intending 
to walk diagonally from the curb across a parking 
area to a public sidewalk in Kanab, Utah. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of appellant's evidence the 
trial court granted respondents' motion to dismiss 
appellant's action. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents Bybee and Mattsson seek to 
have the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is general in 
nature, lacking in transcript page and record refer-
ence. The statement does not include some facts 
which have a direct bearing on the issues involved 
in this appeal. 
The accident for which appellant sought dam-
ages occurred September 16, 1963 in Kanab, Utah, 
when she fell some where between the curb and 
sidewalk on the north side of Center Street after 
leaving the right front seat of an automobile that 
had parked parallel to the curb headed west. (Tr. 
31, 32 Ex. A) The accident occurred on property 
belonging to the City of Kanab and in an area gen-
erally in front of a building and property owned by 
the respondents, Bybee and Mattsson. (Tr. 138) At 
the time, the building was under lease to and occu-
pied by the respondent, California-Pacific Utilities 
Company. (Tr. 141) Center Street runs east and 
west and is bordered on the north by an eight inch 
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high back curb and gutter, next to which is located 
a fairly wide generally unimproved parking strip 
area. (Ex. 1) 
A public sidewalk belonging to Kanab City runs 
along on the north side of the parking area. (Ex. 1) 
The First Security Bank of Salina building 
adjoins respondents' property on the east. Appellant 
was intending to walk in a northeasterly direction 
to the bank on the morning of the accident. (Tr. 30) 
Located on the parking strip area in front of 
respondents' building, about 15 feet apart and ap-
proximately two feet back from the curb, were two 
cement blocks, 18 inches square. These blocks were 
painted red and were raised six to eight inches above 
the parking strip ground level. (Ex. 1) 
These blocks at one time had served as a base 
for support posts for a canopy that extended out to 
the street from the front of respondents' building 
when it had been operated as a service station. (Tr. 
139) Appellant, a long time resident of Kanab 
worked near the area where the accident occurred 
fo1· many yea1·s. She had been to the bank regularly 
and had seen the blocks on numerous occasions. (Tr. 
43 and Tr. 50) 
The weather was clear and bright (tr. 43). She 
had good vision (Tr. 50) . Nothing distracted her 
and there was no reason why she could not have 
rnncentrated on the business of walking from her 
ear to the bank. (Tr. 50, 51, 52) 
') 
•J 
At appellant's deposition taken some 14 months 
after the accident she testified, "Well, I stepped on 
it and I don't know whether it was right on the curb 
where I stepped out to step up on the curb but I 
stepped out and then stepped up and brought my 
other foot forward and then I went over and that's 
all I know and all I can tell you." (Dep. p. 17, Tr. 
46) 
At the trial in attempting to describe what oc-
curred, appellant testified she got out of the car, 
closed the door, started to walk and then, "and I 
fell over something but I don't know what it was." 
(Tr. 32). She was unable to state whether she had 
taken more than one step or if so, how many. She 
did not know what object she encountered, that 
caused her to fall. It could have been the cement 
block, it could have been a pipe, it could have been a 
rock or some other object in the area, including 
grass or weeds. (Tr. 56, Ex. 1) 
It is readily apparent from a reading of appel-
lant's testimony that she has no knowledge of what 
caused her to fall. (Tr. 55, 56, 57 and 58) 
The trial court at the conclusion of appellant's 
case granted a motion for dismissal as to each of the 
respondents upon the grounds that appellant from 
her evidence had failed to establish a cause of action 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WHERE 
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE AS TO THE PROX-
IMATE CAUSE OF INJURY WAS BASED ON 
SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE. 
In appellant's brief under Points I and II, it is 
contended that respondents, Bybee and Mattsson 
owed a duty to the appellant and that they failed 
to perform that duty. While these two principals 
are necessary elements of appellant's case, it is read-
ily apparent that neither element need come under 
consideration if appellant failed to produce evidence 
to support a finding that the conduct complained of 
was the proximate cause of her injury. The proxi-
mate cause of an injury is never presumed and the 
burden rests on the appellant to prove this proposi-
tion. Jackson vs. Colston, 16 Utah 295, 209 P. 2d 
066 Utah (Utah 1949). 
It is an elementary and long standing principal 
of law that where a plaintiff seeks damages for in-
juries sustained as a result of negligent conduct of 
a deendant the burden is upon plaintiff to produce 
C:\'idence to substantiate his claim and where it ap-
pears from the plaintiff's evidence that the accident 
complained of may have been occasioned by one of 
two 01· seve1·al equally probable causes; only one of 
which the defendant could have been responsible for, 
the plaintiff's case fails as a matter of law. 
Trenielling vs. Southeni Pacific Co., 51 
Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80 (Utah 1917) 
The court may not permit a jury to consider a 
question of proximate cause which is based on mat- , 
ters of speculation and conjecture. Dern Investment 
Co. vs. Carbon Coiinty Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P. 
2d 660 (Utah 1938). 
The appellant first initiated a claim in this 
case by filing a formal damage claim dated October 1 
3, 1963 with Kanab City. In her claim, a copy of 
which is attached to the appellant's complaint on 
file herein, she alleges on information and belief 
that she tripped over a raised cement block with 
several pipes projecting therefrom which was lo-
cated almost against the curb and refers to pipes 
projecting to the east of the cement block. (Ex. A, 
plaintiff's complaint and record). 
From appellant's complaint filed September 11, 
1964, under paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8, she appears 
to have abandoned her claim that she tripped over 
a raised cement block and alleges that she tripped 
over a pipe projecting above the sidewalk. (Plain-
tiff's Complaint, Record). 
From a review of the transcript of testimony 
and examination of the photograph exhibits it be-
come readily apparent that at the time of the acci-
dent there were no pipes protruding from either of 
the two cement blocks located on the parkway. (Plt's 
Ex. 1, Def. Ex. A, t. 68, tr. 145, tr. 151). So also , 
the evidence discloses that the only pipe in the area 
could not have been a proximate cause of appellant's 
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fall. This pipe which was about three or four inches 
in height and below the level of the cement block 
was located immediately on the east side of the most 
easterly of the two blocks and so close to the block 
that it could not readily be removed until the block 
itself was removed and obviously inacessible to the 
appellant's path of travel. (Tr. 153, Ex. A) 
The appellant testified that upon leaving the 
car she turned and proceeded in a generally north-
easterly direction (Tr. 53) thus placing the pipe on 
the far side of the block from her path of travel. 
It is readily apparent from a reading of ap-
pellant's testimony both on direct examination and 
on cross examination that she did not know what 
caused her to fall. On direct examination she said: 
"Q. Tell us what happened as you got out of 
the car. 
A. Well, I opened the door and the car was 
close enough to the curb that I didn't 
have to step down in. I just turned side-
ways, stepped out of the car, and put my 
other foot out, pulled myself, you know, 
as I walked up closed the door and start-
ed to walk and I fell over something but 
I don't know what it was.'' (Tr. 32) 
and again on cross exam in a ti on: 
"Q. And you can't tell us then whether it 
was on the third or fourth step or what-
ever it was that your foot hit and you 
don't know which foot hit? 
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A. No. 
Q. And you don't know whether you hit the 
cement block or the pipe or some other 
object in the area, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you? 
A. No. 
Q. There could have been a loose rock in the 
area that you might have stumbled over 
a good size rock as big as a cantalope? 
A. There was a lot of grass around there. 
Q. That you might have stumbled over that? 1 





Well, I was thinking about weeds. Could 
you have stumbled in some weeds? 
I don't think so. 
Do you know whether there was a rock 
there that you might have stumbled over, 
hidden in the grass or weeds? 
A .. No. 
Q. You just don't know? 
A. I don't know." (Tr. 56) 
There was a marked break in the inside edge 
of the curb at the point where appellant claims to 
have stepped from after leaving the automobile (Ex. 
6) . There were irrigulari ties in the levels in the 
cement and dirt areas across which she claims to 
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have been crossing and there were weeds growing in 
the dirt area. (Ex. A) 
A consideration of all of the evidence points 
not to one but to several equally probable causes for 
appellant's fall, other than that contended for by 
appellant's counsel in his brief. Logically, it would 
seem more probable that appellant tripped over a 
break in the curbing, a weed, or an irregularity in 
the level of the cement than that she would have 
tripped over a six inch high, 18 inch square cement 
block that was painted red, which was readily ap-
parent and which apellant testified she knew was 
there. ('Tr. 43, 50) Or that she could have tripped 
over a three or four inch piece of pipe completely 
inaccessible to her path of travel. 
In the Tremelling case (supra) plaintiff sought 
to recover for the wrongful death of her husband 
who was killed while working for the Southern Pa-
cific Railroad Co. The deceased died from a skull 
fracture, which from the evidence could have been 
caused either from his striking his head on a rail-
road car on the adjoining track or from striking his 
head after falling from the car on which he was 
riding. This court in ruling that plaintiff's proof as 
to proximate cause had failed stated: 
"The rule is well established that where 
an accident occurs through the alleged negli-
gence of one person which resu~t~ in injury or 
damage to another, and the mJured person 
seeks to recover damages, and it is made to 
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appear that the accident may have been oc-
casioned by one or two or several causes, and 
that the person complained of is responsible 
only for one of them, then the burden is on 
the plaintiff to show that the accident and re-
sulting damages were produced by the cause ' 
for which the person complained of is respon-
sible, and in case of a failure to establish such 
fact the plaintiff must fail in the action. In , 
29 Cyc. 625, it is said: 
'The evidence must, however, do 
more than merely raise a conjecture or 
show a probability as to the cause of the 
injury, and no recovery can be had if the 
evidence leaves it to conjecture which of 
two probable causes resulted in the in-
jury, where defendant was liable for only 
one of them.' 
"If the probabilities are equally balanced 
that the accident was produced by a cause for 
which the defendant is responsible or by one 
fo which he is not, the plaintiff must fail." 
( 51 Utah 200, 170 Pac. 83) 
This court in Sumsion vs. Streator-Sniith, Inc., 
103 Utah 44, 132 P 2d 680 ( 1953) and in Devine vs. 
Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P 2d 1023 ( 1955) has 
reaffirmed the rule in the Tremelling case. The 
court said: 
"While deductions may be based on prob-
abilities, the evidence must do more th~n 
merely raise a conjecture or show a probabil-
ity. Where there are probabilities the other 
way equally or more potent the deductions 
are mere quesses and the jury should not be 
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permitted to speculate. The rule is well estab-
lished in this jurisdiction that where 'the 
proximate cause of the injury is left to con-
jecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of 
law'." 
Appellant contends in her brief that although 
she did not know what caused her to fall at the time, 
she later returned to the scene and concluded that 
she fell either over the cement block or a pipe and 
that this conclusion establishes a jury question as 
to proximate cause. 
The appellant's reasoning that such could be 
the rule is redundant in that the conclusion on the 
part of appellant is itself of necessity based upon 
speculation and conjecture in view of her own direct 
testimony that she does not know what caused her to 
fall and the evidence in its entiretly leaves available 
two or more equally probable causes of the accident. 
A careful reading of the opinions and record 
of the three cases cited by appellant are not in point. 
The question of proximate cause here presented was 
not at issue in those cases nor can they be viewed 
as a modification of the rules in the Tremelling ca.se 
(supra). 
The appellant's testimony and evidence present-
ed at the trial of her case left the question of proxi-
mate cause of her injury to speculation and conjec-
ture and it is submitted that the trial court was cor-
rect in granting a dismissal of the action. 
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POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
ASSUMED THE RISK 
If it is assumed that the evidence was suffi-
cient to raise a jury question on the matter of the 
proximate cause of the injury respondents submit 
that appellant's action still fails as a matter of law 
on contributory negligence and asumption of risk. 
There is no question concerning respondents 
1 
knowledge of the cement blocks. (Tr. 43) She had 1 
seen them many times. She had good vision and good 
visibility (Tr. 50) Nothing distracted her attention 
(Tr. 51) and there was no reason why she could 
not have concentrated on where she was walking 
(Tr. 52). 
In addition, appellant had a clear alternative 
route which was convenient and without the hazard 
she complains of. 
If in fact apellant fell over the cement block as 
she assumes she obviously was not maintaining a 
proper lookout for her own safety. She is without 
excuse for her failure to see a condition which was 
readily apparent. Under these circumstances this 
court has repeatedly found negligence as a matter 
of law. 
In the case of Wold vs. Ogden City, 123 Utah 
270, 258 P. 2d 453, the plaintiff was injured while 
attempting to cross in darkness, a trench approxi-
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1nately four feet deep and 2:Y2 feet wide, which was 
in front of his property. In his effort one of the 
banks of the trench gave way under his foot, result-
ing in his injury. There was evidence that the con-
stmction company had been requested to repair a 
safe place of crossing and that others had jumped 
across the trench on a number of occasions. The 
alternative was to travel one-half block to cross the 
street. The plaintiff exposed himself to this known 
danger in order to exercise a right and privilege 
which hed had to use the streets. In this regard the 
court observed: 
"But such right and privilege are not 
without limitation and certainly cannot in-
clude the prerogative of use without the ex-
ercise of due care. It would seem that a rea-
sonable, prudent person would not expose 
himself to a known danger when there is an 
easy, known and convenient route about it!" 
A dismissal of the plaintiff's action was sustained. 
In the case of Eisener vs. Salt Lake City, 238 P 
2d 416, 417, 120 Utah, 675, plaintiff was injured 
from a fall on a defective sidewalk. The court con-
cluded that she was negligent as a matter of law. 
At the point of the injury a slab of cement 6' x 8' 
had been removed for the purpose of installing a 
~ewer for an adjacent business house, and the city 
had also excavated to install a water meter. The soil 
had settled, leaving an irregular depression of about 
eight inches at the deepest place, and the defect had 
Pxisted for over a year. 
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The plaintiff lived near the area and passed 
it frequently and was aware of its potential danger. 
During daylight hours, as she passed in the vicinity, 
a group of children momentarily distracted her at-
tention and she fell into the depression and suffered 
injury. In sustaining the trial court's directed ver-
dict the court used this language : 
"That the degree of care which one must 
exercise for his own safety is a matter for the 
jury generally is true, but the authorities 
seem to hold that a pedestrian with prior 
knowledge of a sidewalk defect and an un- 1 
obstructed daylight view who steps into a vis- ! 
ible defect is contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law, such action falling short of 
standards attributable to the reasonable pru-
dent man." 
The principles announced in the Eisener case 
are reaffirmed in Cole vs. Kloepfer, 123 Utah 452, 
260 P. 2d 518. There this court sustained a directe<l 
verdict for personal injuries caused by a defective 
sidewalk. The plaintiff was aware of the sidewalk 
condition by reason of her pr•evious use of the area. 
During the late afternoon while plaintiff was mo-
mentarily distracted by a passing automobile, she 
stubbed her toe on the abutting pavement, fell and 
suffered injury. A momentary distraction did not 
excuse the plaintiff from observing what she ought 
to have seen. 
Additionally appellant in the present case 
points to nothing that distracted her atention. 
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This court has frequently set forth those cir-
cumstanced under which the assumption of risk 
doctrine is applicable as a defense. In the case of 
Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P. 2d 884, 
887, the court stated: 
"The fundamental consideration under-
lying it (assumption of risk) is that one 
should not be permitted to knowingly and vol-
untarily incur an obvious risk of personal 
harm when he has the ability to avoid doing 
so, and then hold another responsible for his 
injury. Its essential elements are knowledge 
of a danger and a free and voluntary consent 
to assume it." Citing Clay vs. Dunford, 121 
Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075. 
The doctrine was found applicable in Wold vs. 
Oyden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P. 2d 453, because 
the plaintiff had exposed himself to a known danger 
when there was an easy known and convenient route 
around it. 
So in the present case appellant elected to walk 
diagonally across the parking strip in tfiat area 
which was not paved and contained the cement 
blocks and weeds and even though within a few feet 
there was a safe route around these objects. (Ex. A) 
In Wightrnan vs. Bettilyn's Inc. 15 Utah 2d 
200, 390 P. 2d 120 ( 1964), this court sustained the 
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trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's case as a matter 
of law. The plaintiff, a pedestrian was injured whe11 
she tripped over some weeds that encroached on the 
sidewalk, a condition of which she was aware prior 
to the accident. This court in its opinion stated: 
"Appellant was aware of the condition 
of the sidewalk and as a reasonably prudent i 
person had knowledge that there was danger 
of tripping and falling in traveling over such 
a walk. Since the danger was apparent and I 
she was aware of it, the duty was hers to give i 
heed to her own safety by carefully observing I 
and avoiding entrapment by weeds or if it I 
was too dark for such observation to use an- i 
other route even though somewhat less con- i 
venient as she had done in the past when she i 
wished to avoid dirtying her clothes in the j 
weeds. The court did not err in concluding 
that the danger being apparent, appellant was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
for failing to give heed to her own safety." 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's evidence at the trial of the case 
was not sufficient to sustain her burden of proof. 
The evidence as to the proximate cause of her fall 
was left to speculation and conjecture and did not 
therefore present a question for the jury. 
Even if appellant's conclusion as to the cause 
of her fall are accepted the evidence shows that she 
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was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and 
assumed the risk. 
The ruling of the trial court dismissing plain-
tiff's action was proper and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
Lamar Bybee, Carvel Matts-
son, Administrator of the 
Estate of O'Dell Watson, 
Deceased. 
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